, a distinguished pair of scholars, introduced an intriguing perspective of how benevolent sexism may play a potent role in the inequality between the genders, as does hostile sexism. They also provided an overview of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Glick et al., 2000) , which is a central measure supporting the findings relevant to their arguments. In an impressive undertaking, reported means from 19 different countries represented by over 15,000 participants across the two main scales of the ASI: hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. They provided compelling arguments about the important implications of these findings for how researchers conceptualize and study both obvious and "kinder/gentler" forms of prejudice. They also cleverly used earlier findings, such as those of Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, and Zhu (1997) , to explain how the dissonance generated from endorsements of both hostile and benevolent sexism can be reconciled. discussed the prevalence of hostile and benevolent sexism and used the ASI results as a basis for describing the prevalence of these types of sexism. However, a close examination of both hostile and benevolent sexism scale means across the 19 countries, as well as the rating scale that participants used for completing the ASI, does not suggest that much ambivalence existed among the samples examined by the experimenters.
In the ASI, 11 items compose the hostile sexism scale, and 11 separate items compose the benevolent sexism scale. A 6-point Likerttype scale ranging from 0 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly) is used to complete each of the 22 items. Raw scores for both scales are added and divided by 11. Thus, potential scale scores range from 0 to 5 for both scales.
On average, men from 6 of the 19 countries and women from only 1 country endorsed hostile sexism above 3.0 (agree slightly). Likewise, on average, men from only 5 of the 19 countries and women from 5 countries endorsed benevolent sexism above 3.0. Further, using the means displayed in Figures 2 and 3 , approximate descriptive data were computed for hostile sexism (M = 2.75, SD = 0.49 for men; M = 2.04, SD = 0.42 for women) and benevolent sexism (M = 2.56, SD = 0.62 for men; M = 2.57, SD = 0.46 for women). For hostile sexism, these descriptives are slightly greater for men and much greater for women when comparing them with Glick and Fiske's (1996) descriptive results for a smaller sample. For benevolent sexism, the general results of research are moderately reduced for men and women compared with the data reported by Glick and Fiske (1996) . Assuming that the Likert-type scale can be used as a continuum of agreement or endorsement of both hostile and benevolent sexism, their 2001 results suggest that both men and women, on average, "disagreed slightly" to "agreed slightly" with both constructs. Ambivalence, or cognitive dissonance as Festinger (1957) first described it, would seem to exist only if two separate cognitions are equally endorsed. Both men and women appear to endorse hostile and benevolent sexism to very minimal degrees. Thus, a discrepancy between the constructs does not appear to exist according to the ASI.
The data examined by were also reported in Glick et al. (2000) . However, neither article reported standard deviations of the hostile and benevolent sexism scales by country. Much of the dilemma discussed here may be remedied by an examination of the variance of scale scores. However, if little variance does exist among the scale scores, the dilemma discussed here may also have important implications for the correlational results that are discussed within . Given the degree of variance reported by Glick and Fiske (1996) , it does not appear that the majority of participants endorsed hostile or benevolent sexism past "slightly disagree." Researchers are cautioned against considering the results discussed by as anything more than preliminary. Although the factor structure of the ASI has been supported, alternative instruments that better reveal benevolent prejudices are warranted before researchers can appropriately examine the intriguing ideas discussed by Glick and Fiske (February 2001) correctly defined prejudice as an erroneous generalization about a group. Their discussion assumed the falsity of the beliefs they identified as typical of benevolent sexism: for example, the belief that the average woman is more nurturing and more caring than the average man and the belief that the average man is more ambitious and more competitive than the average woman (p. 110). Glick and Fiske, however, provided no evidence to support their assumption that these beliefs are false. In fact, there is evidence that the beliefs that Glick and Fiske labeled as signs of prejudice are in fact correct beliefs about differences in the central tendency of gender differences with regard to personality traits. This is not the place to review the avalanche of recent studies demonstrating the reality of gender differences in personality. Just three examples follow: Hall (1990) assembled an abundance of data demonstrating that women are better able to understand nonverbal communication. Kring and Gordon (1998) presented compelling evidence that women are indeed more expressive of emotion. Quantitative personality inventories do in fact reveal that the average woman is more trusting and more nurturing than the average man (Feingold, 1994) . These gender-based personality differences may reflect gender differences in underlying neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, differences that are apparent in infancy and early childhood, differences that are found across cultures and across races, and differences that persist throughout life. These differences have recently been reviewed elsewhere (Halpern, 2000; Sax, 2001) .
If gender differences in personality are real, then the belief that there are gender differences in personality should not be labeled as prejudice, benevolent or otherwise, without first investigating whether the individual's particular beliefs about gender differences correspond to reality.
Glick and Fiske might therefore consider redefining their research: Instead of attempting to show how benevolent sexism reinforces hostile sexism, they should perhaps instead investigate how paternalistic societies (and individuals) exploit real gender differences in personality to perpetuate male hegemony and female subordination.
It should also be noted that the 22-item Ambivalent Sexism Inventory used by contains many items with debatable construct validity (e.g., Item 13: "Men are incomplete without women"). If the respondent agreed with this statement, Glick and Fiske considered that agreement to be evidence of sexism, specifically of what they called benevolent sexism. Glick and Fiske may be aware that this belief-that men are incomplete without women-is foundational to Judaism (e.g., "it is not good for man to be alone," Gen. 2:18, Jewish Publication Society) and that it is one of the strongest and most consistent messages of the Talmud:
One who does not marry dwells without blessing, without goodness, without peace (Yeb. 62b). . . . He who has no wife cannot be considered whole (Pes. 113a). . . . No man without a wife, neither a woman without a husband, nor both of them without God (Gen. Rabbah 8:9)." (Donin, 1972, p. 123) This belief, which assumed to be erroneous, is not confined to Judaism. In medieval France, an unmarried man would still have been addressed as garçon (boy), even if he were 40 years old (Hymowitz, 2000, p. 201) . Hymowitz (2000) observed that "in Korea, a person's wedding day is sometimes referred to as Day One, the beginning of complete personhood" (p. 201). Indeed, it is a biological truism from an evolutionary perspective that men are indeed incomplete without women, just as women are incomplete without men: One sex cannot reproduce without the other. These same arguments apply to Items 1 and 6 on Glick and Fiske's inventory, as these items are very nearly notational variants of Item 13.
Nevertheless, did not hesitate to conclude that agreement with this simple statement-that men are incomplete without women-is evidence of benevolent sexism, which they defined as an erroneous belief system. No wonder Glick and Fiske found benevolent sexism so widespread.
Ambivalent Responses
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We are not surprised that our contention (Glick & Fiske, February 2001) that sexism is based not solely on antipathy but also on apparently benevolent attitudes has elicited some skeptical reactions. It is ironic, however, that Petrocelli (2002, this issue) questioned the pervasiveness of benevolent (and therefore ambivalent) attitudes toward women, whereas Sax (2002, this issue) cited the ubiquity of such attitudes to support his argument that they reflect accurate perceptions of innate sex differences (and therefore ought not to be labeled as sexism). As with any basic research in psychology, questions about the frequency or strength with which a particular phenomenon actually occurs are not easily resolved, as the opposing claims of these two critics illustrate. Nevertheless, we believe that our research offers good evidence that ambivalent sexism exists and predicts discrimination against women.
Petrocelli (2002) asked, "where's the ambivalence?" (p. 443). He contended that low mean scores on both hostile sexism and benevolent sexism in many of the nations we studied suggest that there is not a significant degree of ambivalence toward women. As DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.57.6-7.444a DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.57. 6-7.444b 
